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I. INTRODUCTION
The most recent global financial crisis resulted in part from a failure of
international law. 1 Politicians and other regulators in the United States and
abroad failed to effectively work together to create a consistent and proper level
of regulation for the financial institutions, the mortgage-backed securities, and
the credit default swaps that were at the heart of the crisis.2 As evidenced by the
recent crisis, the globalization of financial markets within the past few decades
has created new systemic risk in which national crises can quickly and easily
spread across national borders. 3 In the absence of better coordination by
politicians and other regulators in the United States and abroad, global financial
crises are likely to occur with greater regularity and severity as the world
continues to become more interconnected.
Even if a cohesive web of international financial regulation can be
developed, enforcement of the various strands of that web of regulation remains
a concern. Speaking about the causes of and the remedies to the most recent
financial crisis, the United States Department of the Treasury wrote in its June
I To be fair, a wide variety of other causes also exist for the most recent financial crisis
beyond just a failure of international law. See, e.g., Barbara Black, Protecting the Retail
Investor in an Age of Financial Uncertainty, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 61, 63 (2010) (arguing
that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission should have done more to
prevent the most recent financial crisis by better regulating the securities and securities
transactions that were at the heart of the crisis); Robert Hardaway, The Great American
Housing Bubble: Re-Examining Cause and Effect, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 33, 59 (2010)
(crediting the most recent financial crisis to politicians who created a housing bubble by
extending "home mortgage tax subsidies for the richest Americans ... [and] pressuring
banks to extend mortgages to marginal buyers"); Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Disclosure and
Judgment: "We Have Met Madoff and He Is Ours," 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 139, 140 (2010)
(asserting that failures in individual judgment were at the heart of the most recent financial
crisis); Robert T. Miller, Morals in a Market Bubble, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 113, 136 (2010)
(arguing that "the financial crisis began at the Federal Reserve, where Alan Greenspan and
his colleagues on the Federal Open Market Committee made some mistakes in the early
years of this decade by keeping interest rates very low for a very long time"); Steven A.
Ramirez, Subprime Bailouts and the Predator State, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 81, 84 (2010)
(arguing that the most recent financial crisis was caused by "an orgy of reckless financial
management [in which] a number of very large financial firms pursued short-term profits
without regard to risks borne by their firms").2 See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3
VA. L. & Bus. REv. 191, 193 (2008) ("The global scale of the current troubles shows that
other countries have been too lax as well, so that there should be a ratcheting up of securities
regulation not only in the United States, but worldwide.").
3 See Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 105, 112 (2007) ("An interesting challenge in the regulation of foreign investments is
the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when things go wrong overseas, like
the Parmalat scandal or the Asian financial crisis of 1997."); Roberta S. Karmel, The Case
for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 33 (1999) ("Stock
market crashes and financial firm failures have become international, just like trading
markets.").
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2009 white paper, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation (the
Report),4 "Without consistent supervision and regulation, financial institutions
will tend to move their activities to jurisdictions with looser standards, creating
a race to the bottom and intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial
system." 5 Beyond just financial institutions, similar concerns exist regarding all
financial market participants who may seek to avoid regulatory scrutiny. 6
Remarkably, anti-corruption law has largely been ignored as a necessary
component of financial regulatory reform. Communicating through the United
States Department of the Treasury's report on the financial crisis, the Obama
Administration failed to mention the role of domestic or transnational anti-
corruption law as a component of creating stable global financial markets. 7 In
fact, the term "corruption" never even appears within the Report. 8 The Report
does contain a variety of goals for raising international regulatory standards and
improving international cooperation. 9 One must worry, however, that corruption
in certain jurisdictions may hamper achieving these goals because even if
appropriate laws and regulations are passed, corrupt government officials may
be unwilling to enforce them.
Worse yet, the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the Act) 10 also fails to address domestic or
transnational anti-corruption law. In fact, the word "corruption" is never
mentioned in the myriad of provisions within the Act. 1 1 One might argue that
corruption is not addressed within the provisions of Act because political
4 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW
FOUNDATION 2 (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/Final
Report web.pdf.
5 Id. at 80 (discussing the need to "raise international regulatory standards and improve
international cooperation" to prevent future financial crises).
6 See Susan Wolburgh Jenah, Commentary on a Blueprint from Cross-Border Access
to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 69, 77 (2007)
(discussing international securities regulation and suggesting that the key to such regulation
is "to strike the right balance between a healthy degree of regulatory competition and
proverbial 'race to the bottom"').
7 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4.
8 See id.
9 1d. at 78 88 (listing goals for raising international regulatory standards and
improving international cooperation including strengthening the international capital
framework; improving the oversight of global financial markets; enhancing supervision of
internationally active financial firms; reforming crisis prevention and management
authorities and procedures; strengthening the Financial Stability Board; strengthening
prudential regulations; expanding the scope of regulation; introducing better compensation
practices; promoting stronger standards in the prudential regulation, money
laundering/terrorist financing, and tax information exchange areas; improving accounting
standards; and tightening oversight of credit rating agencies).
10 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20,
22, 26, 28, 31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.).
11 See id
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corruption was not a cause of the most recent financial crisis. Even if that is the
case, Congress promulgated the Act as a comprehensive overhaul of financial
regulation in the United States. 12
As I have discussed elsewhere, 13 the Act represents an incomplete vision
for financial regulation because of its failure to adequately address the
globalization of financial markets and to provide necessary international law
reforms. 14 In regard to anti-corruption law, the Act fails to direct any of the
newly created agencies to focus on anti-corruption issues, 15 and even though the
Act requires a plethora of studies, Congress failed to mandate a single study
regarding the role of anti-corruption regulation in protecting the interests of the
United States and in creating stable global financial markets. 16
12 As stated in the preamble, Congress promulgated the Dodd-Frank Act "[t]o promote
the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end 'too big to fail,' to protect the American taxpayer by ending
bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other
purposes." Id. In short, Congress drafted the Dodd-Frank Act to be a comprehensive
overhaul of financial regulation in the United States.13 See Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening Corporate
Responsibility in International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REv. 1431 (2011).
14 But see Henry Klehm ill, Joan E. McKown & Emily A. Posner, Securities
Enforcement Has Crossed the Border: Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial
Crisis iwith a Callfor Greater International Cooperation, but Where Will That Lead?, 13 U.
PA. J. Bus. L. 927, 936-40 (2011) (arguing that various general provisions of the Dodd-
Frank Act can be employed in ways that combat transnational corruption).
15 The Dodd-Frank Act does contain a handful of general provisions that mandate
international coordination that may lead to progress in combating transnational corruption.
Specifically, section 175(a) of the Act permits the President or the President's designees to
"coordinate through all available international policy channels, similar policies as those
found in United States law relating to limiting the scope, nature, size, scale, concentration,
and interconnectedness of financial companies, in order to protect financial stability and the
global economy." Dodd-Frank Act § 175(a) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5373). Section
175(b) mandates that the Chairperson of the Financial Stability Oversight Council "regularly
consult with the financial regulatory entities and other appropriate organizations of foreign
governments or international organizations on matters relating to systemic risk to the
international financial system." Id. § 175(b). Section 175(c) mandates that the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of the Treasury "consult with
their foreign counterparts and through appropriate multilateral organizations to encourage
comprehensive and robust prudential supervision and regulation for all highly leveraged and
interconnected financial companies." Id. § 175(c). And, finally, section 112(a)(2)(D) of the
Act expressly requires the Financial Stability Oversight Council to "monitor domestic and
international financial regulatory proposals and developments, including insurance and
accounting issues, and to advise Congress and make recommendations in such areas that will
enhance the integrity, efficiency, competitiveness, and stability of the U.S. financial
markets." Id. § I 12(a)(2)(D) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5322). These general provisions,
however, can hardly be considered a mandate from Congress to fight transnational
corruption.
16 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2, 5, 7, 11, 12, 15, 18, 20,
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Progress has recently been made within the United States relating to
transnational anti-corruption regulation. Professor Mike Koehler, a leading
commentator and expert on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), has
declared that a "big" and "bold" new era of FCPA enforcement has begun. 17 In
addition, Congress has recently conducted hearings on the FCPA. 18 Progress
has also been made in the international sphere with the relatively recent
adoption of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Anti-Bribery Convention, 19 United Nations Convention Against
Corruption, 20 and a number of other international agreements regarding
transnational anti-corruption regulation. 2 1 Still, the lack of mention of domestic
and transnational anti-corruption law in the massive body of the Dodd-Frank
Act is extraordinarily troubling.
A robust and comprehensive system of transnational anti-corruption law is
required to create stable global financial markets. The realities of an
increasingly interconnected world precipitated the enactment of the FCPA to
prevent persons and other entities from engaging in activity that would corrupt
foreign government officials.22 The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,2 3 the
United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 24  and various other
international agreements 25 have helped to spread transnational anti-corruption
22, 26, 28, 31, 42, and 44 U.S.C.) (requiring dozens of studies for purposes of future
regulatory action).17 See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters
a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99 (2011).
18 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (2011);
Examining Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm on Crime and Drugs of the S Comm. on the Judiciary, 111 th Cong. (2010).
19 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec.
17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Anti-Bribery Convention].20 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41.
21 See infra Part II.D (discussing various other international agreements regarding anti-
corruption regulation).22 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).2 3 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 19.
24 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 20.
25 See African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, July 11,
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5; Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight
Against Corruption, Dec. 21, 2001, available at http://www.afrimap.org/english/images/
treaty/ECOWAS Protocol on Corruption.pdf; South African Development Community
Protocol Adopted the Protocol Against Corruption, Aug. 14, 2001; Council of Europe, Civil
Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, E.T.S. No. 174 [hereinafter Civil Law
Convention on Corruption]; Council of Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption,
Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505 [hereinafter Criminal Law Convention on Corruption];
Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, May 26, 1997, 1997
O.J. (C 195) 1; Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against
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laws throughout the rest of the world. The adoption and enforcement of these
laws, however, remains incomplete. 26 In the absence of a robust and
comprehensive system of transnational anti-corruption laws, the global financial
markets remain subject to greater risk of future financial crises.
This Article will focus only on transnational anti-corruption regulation, i.e.,
laws, such as the FCPA, that prohibit persons and entities from bribing foreign
public officials. Robust and ubiquitous domestic anti-corruption laws are also
essential to creating stable global financial markets. Due to the focus of the
symposium issue in which this Article appears, however, only transnational
anti-corruption law will be discussed. The discussion of domestic anti-
corruption regulation and stable global financial markets will be left for another
day.
This Article contributes to the existing scholarship in three main ways.
First, this Article highlights the glaring omission in the recent wave of financial
regulatory reform to address, or even mention, anti-corruption regulation.27
Second, this Article charts the current state of transnational anti-corruption law
and demonstrates a growing interest in such law. Third, this Article discusses
the path forward in anti-corruption regulation and makes various
recommendations for future regulatory action.
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. Part II of this Article
discusses the rise of transnational anti-corruption law including the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, United Nations
Convention Against Corruption, and various other international agreements to
prevent transnational activities designed to corrupt government officials. Part III
discusses the need for a robust and comprehensive system of transnational anti-
corruption law based upon the globalization of financial markets, the existence
Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 [hereinafter Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption].26 See infra Part 1ll.B (showing that many nations continue to have high levels of
perceived corruption based in part on lack of adequate anti-corruption regulation and lack of
adequate enforcement of that regulation).
2 7 At least one article after the most recent financial crisis has praised the interest of the
international community in anti-corruption regulation. See generally Klehm et al., supra note
14. The authors assert, "In response to the financial crisis, international and national bodies
have placed the issues surrounding global corruption near the top of their agendas." Id. at
929. This is likely a bit of an overstatement. In fact, the authors of the piece make the
following clarification: "Although regulators have recognized the need to engage in
international cooperation to combat corruption and bribery at a global level, it remains to be
seen if this understanding will lead to a meaningful transformation in the area of
enforcement." Id. The failure of the United States Department of the Treasury to mention
anti-corruption regulation in its goals for regulatory reform and the failure of Congress to
mention anti-corruption regulation in the voluminous body of the Dodd-Frank Act makes it
difficult to believe that combatting corruption is sufficiently entrenched in the United States'
financial regulatory agenda. See supra notes 4, 10. In addition, the continued existence of
high levels of perceived corruption in various nations throughout the world means that a lot
of work is left to be done in anti-corruption regulation and enforcement. See infra Part 11.B
(discussing the existence of transnational corruption in global financial markets).
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of transnational corruption within those markets, and the importance of
transnational anti-corruption regulation in preventing or lessening future
financial crises. Part IV discusses the future of transnational anti-corruption
regulation and offers various domestic and international recommendations for
the growth and development of transnational anti-corruption regulation and
enforcement. Ultimately, this Article concludes that a robust and comprehensive
system of transnational anti-corruption law is required to create stable global
financial markets and that in the absence of such a system that financial crises
will occur with greater regularity and with greater severity.
II. THE RISE OF TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW
The current global model of transnational anti-corruption law continues to
develop and evolve. This Part surveys the origins and development of
transnational anti-corruption law both in the United States and abroad.
A. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Remarkably, at the time of the writing of this Article, the origins of the
current global model of transnational anti-corruption law are only roughly three
and a half decades old. When the FCPA was enacted in 1977, it was the first
law of its kind. 28 For roughly two and a half decades after its enactment, the
FCPA remained relatively dormant with few actions being undertaken to
enforce its mandates. 2 9 In recent years, however, the number of enforcement
proceedings has blossomed, 30 and due to various international agreements,
2 8 See Andrew Brady Spalding, Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery
Legislation as Economic Sanctions Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REv. 351, 353
(2010) (noting that the FCPA was the first statute in the world to regulate transnational
corruption).2 9 See Peter J. Henning, Taking Aim at the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, N.Y. TIMES
DEALBOOK (Apr. 30, 2012, 1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/taking-aim-
at-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act ("For the first 30 years or so after its enactment, the
antibribery portion of [the FCPA] was used sporadically. Only a handful of cases were
brought each year against companies, almost always ending in settlements involving a
modest fine, and even fewer involved individuals.").30 See id. ("Prosecutors have now made enforcement of the law a priority, and more
industries have been caught up in investigations. The Justice Department has filed cases
against pharmaceutical manufacturers for dealings with state-run health care programs, and
is reported to be pursuing an investigation into the dealings of American movie studios in
China."); see also John Ashcroft & John Ratcliffe, The Recent and Unusual Evolution of an
Expanding FCPA, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 25, 27 ("[T]he total number of
FCPA cases brought by the DOJ and SEC from 2007 to 2009 more than doubled the total of
all such cases brought in the statute's first 30 years.").
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similar transnational anti-corruption statutes have bloomed throughout the
world. 31
The FCPA is codified in section 13 and section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)32 and in two additional federal statutes.
Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the Exchange Act mandates that every issuer of
securities registered with the SEC "make and keep books, records, and
accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer." 33 This provision was
designed to require registered issuers to keep accurate books and records for
purposes of determining whether unlawful payments have been made abroad.34
Assuming that a registered issuer adheres to the provision, it also creates the
opportunity to detect a variety of other wrongdoing beyond just transnational
bribery. 35
Section 13(b)(2)(B) requires that every issuer of securities registered with
the SEC do the following:
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient
to provide reasonable assurances that
(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of
financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to
maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
respect to any differences .... 36
This provision mandates the creation of adequate internal controls for purposes
of preventing the payment of transnational bribes. 37 Similar to section
13(b)(2)(A), section 13(b)(2)(B), if a registered issuer adheres, has the potential
to prevent a variety of other wrongdoing beyond just transnational bribery.38
31 See infra Part II.B-D (discussing the various international agreements that have
helped to spread laws similar to the FCPA throughout the world).
32 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a 78pp (2006).
3 3 1d. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
34 1d.
35 Id.
36 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv).
3 7 1d.
38 15 U.S.C. § 78(m)(2)(B) (2006).
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Section 30A of the Exchange Act contains one of the three anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA.39 Section 30A provides:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer [of any registered security] ... or for
any officer, director, employee, or agent of such issuer or any stockholder
thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to make use of the mails or any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer,
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value
to
(1) any foreign official for purposes of
(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his
official capacity, (ii) inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any
act in violation of the lawful duty of such official, or (iii) securing any
improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such foreign official to use his influence with a foreign
government or instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or
decision of such government or instrumentality,
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, any person .... 40
Section 30A(2) prohibits similar behavior by an issuer paying bribes to
"any foreign political party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign
political office ... in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining
business for or with, or directing business to, any person."4 1 In addition, section
30A(3) prohibits similar behavior by an issuer paying bribes to
(3) any person, while knowing that all or a portion of such money or thing
of value will be offered, given, or promised, directly or indirectly, to any
foreign official, to any foreign political party or official thereof, or to any
candidate for foreign political office ... in order to assist such issuer in
obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any
person.42
In essence, the provision provides a broad prohibition against transnational
bribery by issuers of securities registered in the United States.
In addition to section 30A of the Exchange Act, two additional provisions
of the United States Code render unlawful transnational bribery. First, 15
U.S.C. § 78dd-2 mirrors the language of section 30A except section 78dd-2
prohibits bribes by domestic concerns, rather than issuers. 43 A "domestic
concern" is "any individual who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United
States" and "any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
3 91d. § 78dd.
401d. § 78dd-l(a)(1).
4 11d. § 78dd-l(a)(2).
42 1d. § 78dd-l(a)(3).
4 3 1d. § 78dd-2(a).
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business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized under the
laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or commonwealth
of the United States." 44 Second, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 mirrors the language of
section 30A and 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2, except 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 prohibits bribes
by persons other than issuers and domestic concerns. 45
The provisions of the FCPA along with the domestic anti-corruption laws in
the United States help to create a robust anti-corruption regime. Especially in
regard to transnational anti-corruption regulation, the United States has been
relatively successful in exporting its system of anti-corruption law around the
globe.
B. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
International agreements have helped transnational anti-corruption
regulation similar to the FCPA to be enacted beyond the borders of the United
States. The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions was signed in December of
1997.46 The Convention is popularly known as the "OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention" and requires countries ratifying it to implement laws criminalizing
bribery of foreign officials. 47
The OECD is an international organization that was founded to encourage
economic development and world trade. 48 It traces its origins to the
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that was established
in 1947 to administer the Marshall Plan for reconstruction of Europe after
World War 11.49 Based on the success of the OEEC, the OEEC began to evolve
into the OECD on December 14, 1960 with the signing of the OECD
Convention. 50 The OECD was officially born on September 30, 1961.51
4415 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (2006).
4 5 Id. § 78dd-3.
4 6 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 19.
4 7 1d.
4 8 History, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/history/
(last visited May 29, 2012).
4 91d.
5 0 ld.
51Id.
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The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention represents one of the OECD's major
successes. As of March 2009, the Anti-Bribery Convention had been ratified by
all 34 OECD member countries. 52 These countries include: Australia, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United
Kingdom, and United States. 53 Five non-member countries are also parties to
the Anti-Bribery Convention: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Russia, and South
Africa. 54
The provisions of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention require that
countries ratifying it adopt transnational anti-corruption laws similar to the
FCPA. Article 1 of the Convention requires that parties adopt laws
criminalizing the bribing of foreign government officials. 55 Article 3 of the
Convention requires that parties provide effective and proportionate sanctions
for those engaging in such criminal activity. 56 In addition, the Anti-Bribery
Convention provides that parities adopt laws requiring that companies keep
accurate books and records, make truthful financial statement disclosure, and
adhere to adequate accounting and auditing standards. 57 The Convention
52 Ratification Status as of April 2012, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/59/13/40272933.pdf (last visited July 1, 2012) (providing the
ratification status of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention).
53 Id.
541d.
5 5 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 19, at art. 1, para 1 ("Each Party shall
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a criminal offence under its
law for any person intentionally to offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary or other
advantage, whether directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that
official or for a third party, in order that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to
the performance of official duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business."); id. at art. 1, para. 2 ("Each Party shall
take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in, including incitement, aiding and
abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery of a foreign public official shall be a criminal
offence. Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be criminal offences
to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to bribe a public official of that Party.").
561d. at art. 3, para. 1 ("The bribery of a foreign public official shall be punishable by
effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties. The range of penalties shall be
comparable to that applicable to the bribery of the Party's own public officials and shall, in
the case of natural persons, include deprivation of liberty sufficient to enable effective
mutual legal assistance and extradition."); see also id at art. 3, para. 2 ("In the event that,
under the legal system of a Party, criminal responsibility is not applicable to legal persons,
that Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be subject to effective, proportionate and
dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions, for bribery of foreign
public officials."); id at art. 3, para. 4 ("Each Party shall consider the imposition of
additional civil or administrative sanctions upon a person subject to sanctions for the bribery
of a foreign public official.").
5 7 1d. at art. 8, para. 1 ("In order to combat bribery of foreign public officials
effectively, each Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, within the framework
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mandates that parties adopt laws providing sanctions against companies that fail
to meet these requirements. 58
In addition to requiring that parties adopt laws and regulations similar to the
FCPA, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention is also important because it
strengthens ties between parties for the purpose of fighting transnational
corruption. Section 1 of Article 9 provides:
Each Party shall, to the fullest extent possible under its laws and relevant
treaties and arrangements, provide prompt and effective legal assistance to
another Party for the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings
brought by a Party concerning offences within the scope of this Convention
and for non-criminal proceedings within the scope of this Convention brought
by a Party against a legal person. The requested Party shall inform the
requesting Party, without delay, of any additional information or documents
needed to support the request for assistance and, where requested, of the status
and outcome of the request for assistance. 59
Because transnational corruption is by definition a transnational event,
cooperation with the government in the jurisdiction where a bribe was directed
can be key to a successful prosecution. In addition, because many companies
operate in more than one country, having cooperation from regulators in other
countries can be key to determining whether a company is maintaining accurate
books and records and maintaining adequate internal controls.
The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention also strengthens ties between parties
for the purpose of fighting transnational corruption by mandating monitoring
and follow-up to ensure that parities are actually adhering to the requirements of
the Convention. Article 12 provides:
The Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic
follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation of this Convention.
Unless otherwise decided by consensus of the Parties, this shall be done in the
framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
Transactions and according to its terms of reference, or within the framework
and terms of reference of any successor to its functions, and Parties shall bear
of its laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and records, financial
statement disclosures, and accounting and auditing standards, to prohibit the establishment
of off-the-books accounts, the making of off-the-books or inadequately identified
transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures, the entry of liabilities with incorrect
identification of their object, as well as the use of false documents, by companies subject to
those laws and regulations, for the purpose of bribing foreign public officials or of hiding
such bribery.").5 8 OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, supra note 19, at art. 8, para. 2 ("Each Party shall
provide effective, proportionate and dissuasive civil, administrative or criminal penalties for
such omissions and falsifications in respect of the books, records, accounts and financial
statements of such companies.").
5 91d. at art. 9, para. 1.
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the costs of the programme in accordance with the rules applicable to that
body.60
For the past decade and a half, the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention has been a
driving force in the spread of transnational anti-corruption regulation
throughout the world.
C. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption
The United Nations Convention Against Corruption has also helped to
spread transnational anti-corruption regulation around the globe. 61 The
provisions of the Convention regarding transnational anti-corruption regulation
draw heavily upon the concepts embodied in the FCPA, OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, and various other international anti-corruption treaties.
The Convention Against Corruption developed from the drafting and
adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime.62 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime by resolution on November 15, 2000.63
That Convention represents the recognition by countries signing and ratifying
the document of the seriousness of transnational organized crime, and it
represents a major step in coordinating international efforts against such
crime. 64 The Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime was designed
in part to address corruption. In the resolution adopting the Convention, the
General Assembly asserts that the Convention "will constitute an effective tool
and the necessary legal framework for international cooperation in combating,
inter alia, such criminal activit[y] as ... corruption." 65 Article 8 of the
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, for example, provides for
the criminalization of corruption and requires each party to the Convention to
adopt laws and regulations criminalizing the intentional promising, offering, or
giving of a bribe to a public official within that nation.66 Article 8 also requires
60 d. at art. 12.
6 1 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 20.
6 2 See U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, 2237
U.N.T.S. 343.
6 3 G.A. Res. 55/25, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (Jan. 1, 2001) (providing the resolution by
the U.N. General Assembly on November 15, 2000 adopting the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime).64 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 62.
65 G.A. Res. 55/25, supra note 63, at 2.
66 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 62, at art. 8,
para. 1 1(a) ("Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The promise,
offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.").
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each party to the Convention to adopt laws criminalizing soliciting, or accepting
of bribes by a public official within that nation. 67
In regard to encouraging and coordinating efforts to prevent transnational
corruption, however, the Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime is
notably deficient. Paragraph 2 of Article 8 provides only that "[e]ach State Party
shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as may be necessary
to establish as criminal offences ... involving [bribery of] a foreign public
official or international civil servant" and that "each State Party shall consider
establishing as criminal offences other forms of corruption." 68 Article 9 does
contain some additional vague requirements that parties to the Convention
adopt measures against corruption and take "effective action" against
corruption.6 9 However, the vague and weak mandate within the Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime that parties must "consider"
criminalizing transnational corruption illustrates the Convention's deficiencies.
Even at the time of the drafting, the deficiencies of the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime in providing adequate anti-corruption regulation
were clear to its drafters.
On October 31, 2003, the General Assembly adopted the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. 70 To provide some context, on December 4,
2000, less than a month after the adoption of the Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime, the General Assembly adopted a resolution
appointing an ad hoc committee to negotiate the creation of an "effective
international legal instrument against corruption.' '7 1 In the resolution, the
General Assembly noted that the reason for the creation of the ad hoc
committee is the "corrosive effect that corruption has on democracy,
development, the rule of law and economic activity. '72 The ad hoc committee's
work ultimately resulted in the Convention Against Corruption, which was
adopted in October of 2003 and entered into force on December 15, 2005.
6 7 1d. at art. 8, para. 1-1(b) ("Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other
measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed
intentionally: ... (b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly,
of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order
that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.").6 8 1d. at art. 8, para. 2.
6 9 1d. at art. 9.
70 G.A. Res. 58/4, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003) (providing the
resolution by the U.N. General Assembly on October 31, 2003 adopting the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption).7 1 G.A. Res. 55/61, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/61 (Jan. 22, 2001) (providing the
General Counsel's resolution on December 4, 2001 mandating the creation of an ad hoc
committee to negotiate the Convention Against Corruption).7 2 1d.
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The Convention Against Corruption is lengthy and complex, but a brief
overview should be provided regarding some of the major provisions relating to
the prevention of transnational corruption. The Convention Against Corruption
requires that parties adopt laws and regulations that are similar to the provisions
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. For example, Article 12 of the Convention
provides:
[E]ach State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in aecordance
[sic] with its domestic laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of
books and records, financial statement disclosures and accounting and auditing
standards, to prohibit the following acts carried out for the purpose of
committing any of the offences established in accordance with this
Convention:
(a) The establishment of off-the-books accounts;
(b) The making of off-the-books or inadequately identified transactions;
(c) The recording of non-existent expenditure;
(d) The entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their objects;
(e) The use of false documents; and
(f) The intentional destruction of bookkeeping documents earlier than
foreseen by the law. 73
In addition, Article 16 provides:
Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed intentionally, the
promise, offering or giving to a foreign public official or an official of a public
international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official
act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties, in order to
obtain or retain business or other undue advantage in relation to the conduct of
international business. 74
Article 16 also provides that states shall adopt laws and regulations to
criminalize the acceptance or solicitation of a bribe by a foreign public
official. 75 Notably, unlike the Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime, which provided that parties to it merely "consider" adopting
7 3 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 20, at art. 12, para. 3.
7 4 1d. at art. 16, para. 1.
7 51d. at art. 16, para. 2 ("Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence, when committed
intentionally, the solicitation or acceptance by a foreign public official or an official of a
public international organization, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the
official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that the official act or refrain
from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.").
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transnational anti-corruption laws and regulations, 76 the Convention Against
Corruption requires that parties to it "shall" adopt such laws and regulations. 77
Chapter IV of the Convention also contains a number of provisions
designed to improve international cooperation in preventing corruption. 78 For
example, Article 46 addresses mutual legal assistance; 79 article 48 addresses
law enforcement cooperation;8 0 and Article 49 addresses joint investigations.8 1
In addition, chapter VI contains provisions relating to technical assistance and
the exchange of information relating to corruption.8 2 Moreover, Article 63 of
the Convention Against Corruption requires the establishment of a Conference
of States Parties to oversee the implementation of the agreement. 83 These
provisions and others in the Convention Against Corruption have helped to
improve cooperation among the 140 signatories and 160 parties to the
Convention at the time of the writing of this Article. 84
D. Other International Agreements Designed to Combat Transnational
Corruption
In addition to the international agreements already mentioned, a number of
other international agreements exist that are designed to combat transnational
corruption. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption are debatably the most important international
agreements because of the economic strength of the countries signing and
ratifying the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the large number of countries
signing and ratifying the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.8 5 At
least some discussion should be provided, however, of a number of the other
international agreements designed to combat corruption to help trace the origins
and growth of transnational anti-corruption regulation on the international
level. 86
7 6 U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, supra note 62, at art. 8.
77 See, e.g., U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 20, at art. 16, para. 1.
7 8 See id. at ch. IV.
7 9 See id. at art. 46.
80 See id. at art. 48.
81 See id. at art. 49.82 See id. at ch. VI.
83 U.N. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 20, at art. 63.
8 4 See Signatories to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, U.N. OFFICE
ON DRUGS & CRIME, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html (last
visited July 7, 2012) (providing a complete list of signatories and parties to the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption).
8 5 See supra notes 52 54 and accompanying text (providing a list of parties to the
OECD Anti-Bribery Convention); supra note 84 and accompanying text (providing a list of
countries who are signatories and parties to the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption).
86As discussed in the previous subsection, the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime also marked an important milestone in the growth of
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The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption was the first
international anti-corruption treaty. 87 The member states of the Organization of
American States drafted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
and it was adopted on March 29, 1996.88 As stated in the preamble to the
document, the member states recognized "that fighting corruption.., prevents
distortions in the economy" and "that, in some cases, corruption has
international dimensions, which requires coordinated action by States to fight it
effectively."8 9 Article VIII of the Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption requires parties to prohibit and punish acts of transnational
bribery. 90 The Convention was also designed to encourage coordination among
party states in fighting corruption.9 1 For example, Article XIV contains broad
mandates requiring assistance and cooperation among parties to the
convention. 92 As of the writing of this Article, the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption has been ratified by dozens of countries in North and South
America. 93
transnational anti-corruption law. See supra Part II.C (discussing the United Nations
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime). In addition, national anti-corruption
laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, also have provided a catalyst for the
development of international agreements on regulation of transnational corruption. See supra
Part II.A (discussing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
8 7 Organization of American States (OAS), INT'L ASS'N OF ANTI-CORRUPT
AUTHORITIES (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.iaaca.org/AntiCorruptionAuthorities/
ByinternationalOrganizations/InterGovernmentalOrganization/201202/t20120215 805470.
shtml; see also Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 25.8 81d. at pmbl.
8 91d.
90 Id. at art. VIII ("[E]ach State Party shall prohibit and punish the offering or granting,
directly or indirectly, by its nationals, persons having their habitual residence in its territory,
and businesses domiciled there, to a government official of another State, of any article of
monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favor, promise or advantage, in connection
with any economic or commercial transaction in exchange for any act or omission in the
performance of that official's public functions.").
91 Id. at art. II, para. 2 (stating that one of the purposes of the Convention is "[t]o
promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among the States Parties to ensure the
effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in
the performance of public functions and acts of corruption specifically related to such
performance").
9 2 
1d at art. XIV.
9 3 Signatories and Ratifications of the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
ORG. OF AM. STATES, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html (last visited May
29, 2012).
1299
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
During the late 1990s, European nations also began developing
international agreements to combat corruption. Although other international
treaties in Europe contained mandates that arguably required the criminalization
of corruption, 94 the European Union enacted the first major international anti-
corruption treaty exclusively among European nations on May 26, 1997 with
the adoption of the Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving
Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States of the
European Union.95 The Convention requires member states of the European
Union to criminalize passive corruption, which occurs when a public official
requests or receives a bribe, 96 and it also requires member states to criminalize
active corruption, which occurs when a person or entity gives or promises a
bribe.97 Importantly, the Convention defines the term "official" to include a
national official of any other member state, which means that parties to the
Convention are required to criminalize transnational bribery. 98 Article 9 of the
Convention also contains broad provisions mandating cooperation in
investigating, prosecuting, and punishing corruption. 99
94 See, e.g., Convention on the Protection of the European Communities' Financial
Interests, July 26, 1995, art. 1, 1995 O.J. (C 316) 49 (requiring that member states of the
European Union adopt laws and regulations protecting the European Communities' financial
interests and criminalizing fraud, including "the use or presentation of false, incorrect or
incomplete statements or documents, which has as its effect the misappropriation or
wrongful retention of funds from the general budget of the European Communities or
budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities" and "the use or
presentation of false, incorrect or incomplete statements or documents, which has as its
effect the illegal diminution of the resources of the general budget of the European
Communities or budgets managed by, or on behalf of, the European Communities").
95 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union, supra note 25.96 Id. at art. 2, para. 1 ("For the purposes of this Convention, the deliberate action of an
official, who, directly or through an intermediary, requests or receives advantages of any
kind whatsoever, for himself or for a third party, or accepts a promise of such an advantage,
to act or refrain from acting in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in
breach of his official duties shall constitute passive corruption.").97 1d. at art. 3, para. 1 ("For the purposes of this Convention, the deliberate action of
whosoever promises or gives, directly or through an intermediary, an advantage of any kind
whatsoever to an official for himself or for a third party for him to act or refrain from acting
in accordance with his duty or in the exercise of his functions in breach of his official duties
shall constitute active corruption.").
9 81d. at art. 1.
9 91d. at art. 9.
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In addition to the European Union, the Council of Europe has also
negotiated and created international agreements to combat corruption. Because
the Council of Europe is currently composed of forty-seven countries, which
exceeds the twenty-seven countries of the European Union, the treaties
generated by the Council of Europe arguably have greater impact.'0 0
On January 27, 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption.10 1 In contrast to earlier anti-corruption treaties, e.g.,
the OECD Anti-bribery Convention and the Convention on the Fight Against
Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of
Member States of the European Union, the Council of Europe's Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption is a more complex and comprehensive agreement
with many similarities to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 102
In terms of transnational anti-corruption regulation, the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption requires parties to criminalize active and passive
bribery relating to foreign public officials and foreign public assemblies. 10 3 In
addition, the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption requires parties to
criminalize active and passive bribery relating to officials of international
organizations, 10 4 members of international parliamentary assemblies, 10 5 and
judges and officials of international courts. 10 6 Chapter IV also contains
extensive provisions regarding international cooperation. 10 7 Notably, Article 24
requires that implementation of the Convention will be monitored by the Group
of States Against Corruption, 0 8 a group formed by the Council of Europe to
monitor compliance with the Council's anti-corruption standards. 109
100 See The Council of Europe in Brief COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/
index.asp?page-nepasconfondre&l-en (last visited July 4, 2012) (comparing and contrasting
the Council of Europe and the European Union).
101 Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 25.
102 See generally id.
103 Id. at art. 5-6.
104 Id. at art. 9.
1051d. at art. 10.
106 Id. at art. 11.
10 7 See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 25, at ch. IV.
108 Id. at art. 24.
109 What is GRECO?, COUNCIL OF EUR., http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/greco/
general/3.%o2OWhato20iso20GRECO en.asp (last visited May 29, 2012).
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In addition, on November 4, 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Civil
Law Convention on Corruption. 110 The purpose of the Convention is to provide
civil remedies for those who have been victims of corruption. I' Each party to
the Convention is required to adopt and provide remedies under that party's
system of law for any person who has suffered as a result of corruption.'112
Article 13 of the Convention contains a broad statement that parties to the
Convention will cooperate in matters relating to civil proceedings, 113 and
Article 14 provides that compliance with the Convention will be monitored by
the Group of States Against Corruption.1 14
During the early 2000s, nations in Africa also began adopting agreements to
combat corruption. On December 21, 2001, the Economic Community of West
African States adopted the Protocol on the Fight Against Corruption. 115 The
Economic Community of West African States is a regional organization of
fifteen African nations designed to promote the economic integration of its
member states, 116 which are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, C6te d'Ivoire,
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, and Togo. 117 The Protocol obligates parties to enact broad
prohibitions against corruption.1 18 The Protocol specifically requires parties to
assess whether their laws are adequate for preventing transnational
corruption, 119 to create laws and regulations discouraging corruption of foreign
officials,120 and to prohibit and punish transnational corruption. 12 1 The Protocol
110 Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 25.
111 Id. at art. 1 ("Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective remedies for
persons who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to defend
their rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage.").
112 Id
113Id. at art. 13 ("The Parties shall co-operate effectively in matters relating to civil
proceedings in cases of corruption, especially concerning the service of documents,
obtaining evidence abroad, jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgements
and litigation costs, in accordance with the provisions of relevant international instruments
on international co-operation in civil and commercial matters to which they are Party, as
well as with their internal law.").
1141d, at art. 14.
115 Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against
Corruption, supra note 25, at 11.
116 ECOWAS in Brief ECON. COMMUNITY OF W. AFR. STATES, http://www.comm.
ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id-about a&lang-en (last visited May 29, 2012).
1 1 7 The ECOWAS Commission, ECON. COMMUNITY OF W. AFR. STATES,
http://www.ecowas.int/ (last visited May 29, 2012) (providing a list of the members of the
Economic Community of West African States).
1' 8 See Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against
Corruption, supra note 25.
1191d. at art. 4, para. 3 ("Each State Party shall review its legislation with a view to
ascertaining whether its current basis for jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the
bribery of foreign public officials, and where it is not, it shall take appropriate remedial
measures.").
120 Id. at art. 5.
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also obligates parties to maintain adequate revenue-collection systems and to
require companies to maintain adequate books and records for purposes of
detecting corruption. 122 Two of the central objectives of the Protocol are "to
intensify and revitalise cooperation between State Parties, with a view to
making anti-corruption measures more effective" and "to promote the
harmonisation and coordination of national anticorruption laws and policies."'123
Unfortunately, the Protocol is supposed to enter into force only upon ratification
by nine signatory states, 124 and sufficient ratification had not yet occurred at the
time of writing of this Article. 12 5
On August 14, 2001, the Southern African Development Community
adopted the Protocol Against Corruption. 126 Similar to the Economic
Community of West African States, the Southern African Development
Community is a regional organization of fifteen African nations designed to
promote the economic integration of its member states, which are Angola,
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, United
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 127 The Protocol contains broad
provisions designed to coordinate and harmonize efforts among parties to
combat domestic and transnational corruption. 12 8 The Protocol specifically
requires parties to prohibit and punish transnational corruption. 129 Parties must
also adopt other deterrents against transnational bribery, including requiring
121 Id. at art. 12, para. 1 ("Each State Party shall prohibit and punish the act of offering
or giving to a foreign public official, either directly or indirectly, any object of pecuniary
value such as gifts, promises or favors, to compensate the public official for an act or an
omission in the exercise of his official functions.").
122 [d. at art. 5.
123 Id. at art. 2.
124 Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight Against
Corruption, supra note 25, at art. 22.
125 international Conventions, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/cleangovbiz/internationalconventions.htm#africa (last visited May 29,
2012) (reporting that the Economic Community of West African States Protocol on the Fight
Against Corruption has never entered into force due to a lack of ratifications).
126 Southern African Development Community Protocol Against Corruption, supra note
25.
127introducing SADC, S. AFR. DEV. COMMUNITY, http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/
page/715 (last visited May 29, 2012) (providing an overview of the Southern African
Development Community).
12 8 See, e.g., Southern African Development Community Protocol Against Corruption,
supra note 25, at art. 2.
1291d. at art. 6, para. 1 ("Subject to its domestic law, each State Party shall prohibit and
punish the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by its own nationals, persons having
their habitual residence in its territory, and businesses domiciled there, to an official of a
foreign State, of any article of monetary value, or other benefit, such as a gift, favour,
promise or advantage, in connection with any economic or commercial transaction in
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of that official's public functions.").
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publicly held companies to maintain adequate books, records, and internal
controls. 130
Finally, on July 11, 2003, the African Union adopted the Convention on
Preventing and Combating Corruption. 131 The African Union is an organization
designed to build unity among and confront economic, social, and political
issues facing its member nations. 132 The Convention on Preventing and
Combating Corruption focuses mainly on the creation of domestic anti-
corruption law within the nations that are parties to the agreement. 133 With that
said, the Convention does require that parties criminalize certain types of
transnational corruption, 134 and it also requires that parties work together to
prevent transnational corruption. 135 The Convention also provides for
cooperation in transnational investigations, 136 and it provides for robust
technical cooperation and mutual legal assistance among parties to the
agreement. 137 In addition, the Convention establishes the Advisory Board on
Corruption to oversee the implementation of the Convention, to advise the
African Union on corruption issues, and to promote anti-corruption law and
regulation.138
13 0 1d. at art. 4, para. 1.
131 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, supra note 25.
132 AU in a Nutshell, AFR. UNION, http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (last visited May
29, 2012) (providing an overview of the African Union, including its origins, objectives, and
structure); see also Member States, AFR. UNION, http://www.au.int/en/member states/
countryprofiles (last visited May 29, 2012) (providing a listing of the member states of the
African Union).
13 3 See African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, supra note
25, at art. 2.
134/d. at art. 19, para. I ("In the spirit of international cooperation, State Parties
shall ... [c]ollaborate with countries of origin of multi-nationals to criminalise and punish
the practice of secret commissions and other forms of corrupt practices during international
trade transactions.").
13 5 1d. at art. 19, paras. 2, 4 ("In the spirit of international cooperation, State Parties
shall ... [floster regional, continental and international cooperation to prevent corrupt
practices in international trade transactions ... [and] [w]ork closely with international,
regional and sub regional financial organizations to eradicate corruption in development aid
and cooperation programmes by defining strict regulations for eligibility and good
governance of candidates within the general framework of their development policy.").
1361d. at art. 19, para. 5 ("In the spirit of international cooperation, State Parties
shall ... [c]ooperate in conformity with relevant international instruments on international
cooperation on criminal matters for purposes of investigations and procedures in offences
within the jurisdiction of this Convention.").
137 See id. at art. 18.
138Id. at art. 22.
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All of these agreements laid the groundwork for the adoption of the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption by the United Nations General
Assembly on October 31, 2003.139 The international agreements to combat
corruption prior to the adoption of the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption and the Convention Against Corruption itself demonstrate two
things. First, the international community has recognized that corruption poses a
threat to the global economy and global civil society. Second, the international
community has recognized that affirmative steps on an international level must
be taken to fight corruption, especially transnational corruption.
III. THE NEED FOR A ROBUST AND COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF
TRANSNATIONAL ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW
After exploring the rise of transnational anti-corruption regulation and
examining the current international architecture of such regulation, the
following question lingers: If comprehensive international agreements exist
regarding transnational anti-corruption regulation, 140 and if many nations,
including the United States, are working vigorously to enforce their
transnational anti-corruption laws,141 why are additional efforts needed to create
and maintain a robust and comprehensive system of transnational anti-
corruption law for purposes of creating stable global financial markets?
This question can be answered in a variety of different ways. First, the
existence of comprehensive international agreements does not mean that the
requirements contained within their provisions have adequately been codified
within the legal systems of the countries that have adopted and ratified the
agreements. Second, even if the requirements of the international agreements
have been codified, that does not mean that countries will adequately enforce
such regulation. Third, if many nations, including the United States, are
working vigorously to enforce their transnational anti-corruption laws, this does
not mean that all countries are behaving this way, which creates global systemic
risk and the potential for a "race to the bottom." Fourth, even if many nations,
including the United States, are working vigorously to enforce their
transnational anti-corruption laws, this may not continue to occur without
consistent and continual dedication to fighting corruption.
13 9 G.A. Res. 58/4, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Nov. 21, 2003) (providing the
resolution by the U.N. General Assembly on October 31, 2003 adopting the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption).140 See supra Part II.B-D (discussing the current international architecture of
transnational anti-corruption regulation, including various international agreements).
141 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the "big" and "bold" new era
of FCPA enforcement).
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Of course, this raises a second more basic question: Why is fighting
corruption so important to creating stable global financial markets? In the
remainder of this section, the globalization of financial markets, the existence of
transnational corruption in global financial markets, and the importance of
transnational anti-corruption regulation in preventing or lessening future
financial crises will be explored.
A. The Globalization of Financial Markets
The globalization of financial markets is beyond peradventure. A few
words, however, ought to be offered about how and why the transition from
national and regional markets to global financial markets has occurred to
highlight the importance of transnational anti-corruption regulation because of
the increasingly interconnected global economy. The world has changed
significantly since 1977, when the FCPA was originally enacted, and a robust
and comprehensive system of transnational anti-corruption regulation is needed
to ensure the stability of the emerging global financial markets.
This is not to claim that the global financial markets that currently exist are
seamless and allow for the unrestricted flow of capital and financial services. 142
Regulation still remains largely set in the national context, rather than on the
international level. 143 Financial markets, however, are significantly more
interconnected and international than when the FCPA came into being.
The transition from national or regional markets to international financial
markets has occurred for a variety of reasons. Although the United States'
financial markets, especially its capital markets, were preeminent for much of
the twentieth century, the growth and development of strong national financial
markets in Asia, Europe, and South America have shifted the focus away from
the United States. 14 4 Notably, the rise of strong national economies in Brazil,
Russia, India, and China, which are commonly referred to as the "BRIC"
nations, has allowed capital and financial services to spread more evenly around
142 See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global
Investing, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 85, 97 (2007) (arguing "that the securities markets have
evolved beyond jurisdictional borders and that its current regulatory regime has resulted in
barriers to competition and placed roadblocks in the way of investor access to cross-border
investment opportunities that have contributed to increased cost and market inefficiencies").
143 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 4, at 80 (noting that in terms of financial
markets, "regulation is still set largely in a national context").
14 4 See Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of Foreign Issuers:
Hfow the U.S. Regulatory Regime Is Affecting the United States' Historic Position as the
World's Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109, 117 (2006) ("The securities
markets outside the United States have grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past
twenty years and now afford issuers in their home countries significant opportunities for
financing that did not previously exist."); Greene, supra note 142, at 85 ("There can be no
argument that the securities markets are now global and that the dominance of the United
States as the leading player in the global marketplace is being challenged.").
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the globe. 145 The rise of the Internet and other forms of communication has tied
together these strong national economies and financial markets in ways that
were not previously possible. 146
Financial market participants now think globally, rather than on a national
or regional basis. For example, increasingly businesses are willing to seek
capital globally, rather than seeking capital within the borders of a single
nation.1 47 In addition, retail and institutional investors now seek opportunities
internationally as a means of portfolio diversification and to offset currency
fluctuations. 148 Financial service providers are also increasingly ignoring
national borders to seek new profit-making opportunities globally. 149
14 5 See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1692,
1711 12 (2008) ("The new strong capital markets in Asia and South America, and in
particular in the so-called BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), challenge both
the EU and the SEC to shape their regulatory approaches to foreign issuers and foreign
financial institutions so as not to lose their competitive places as market regulators.").
14 6 See Greene, supra note 142, at 86 (discussing the role of the Internet in the creation
of transnational capital markets); Jenah, supra note 6, at 69-70 ("Globalization is a fact.
Innovative technologies are driving faster and more efficient trading, and they do not
recognize national borders. Capital market participants are expanding their business
activities into foreign markets. Investors are seeking international investment opportunities.
The impact of these changes is profound and not yet fully realized."); George W. Madison &
Stewart P. Greene, TIAA-CREF Response to A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S.
Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 99, 99 (2007) ("The rapid
pace of technological advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global
capital market. In such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity, greater
diversification, and a wider range of investment options regardless of their location. Capital
would be more efficiently allocated throughout the global economy to the benefit of all
participants."); Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Bhieprintfor Cross-Border Access
to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 31, 33 (2007)
("[A]dvances in technology have lowered structural barriers to the global trade in services as
well as goods, making a truly global capital market (in every sense of the word) a real
possibility.").
14 7 See DeLaMater, supra note 144, at 117 (noting that the growth and development of
markets outside the United States has given many issuers opportunities to seek capital in
places where they could not previsiously).14 8 See Greene, supra note 142, at 85 86 ("Investing in non-U.S. markets is no longer
the exclusive province of megainstitutions or the ultrawealthy; it is an essential component
of prudent portfolio diversification for all investors."); Tafara & Peterson, supra note 146, at
31 ("Investors now search beyond their own borders for investment opportunities and, unlike
the past, many of these investors are not large companies, financial firms, or extremely
wealthy individuals.").
14 9 See Jackson, supra note 3, at 107 ("[I]ssuers are not the only entities with mobility in
modern capital markets: investors, exchanges, brokerage houses, and a wide range of
professional service providers can and do move around the world."); Tafara & Peterson,
supra note 146, at 34 ("For many financial intermediaries, access to overseas securities,
commodities, and currency markets is vital to staying in business.").
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The evolution of securities exchanges provides additional evidence of the
globalization of financial markets. The demutualization of many securities
exchanges in the past few decades has transformed these exchanges into for-
profit entities. 150 As a result, these exchanges have been willing to eschew
previous nationalistic and protectionist tendencies and have begun to seek
profit-making opportunities beyond their home nations. 151 The wave of
securities exchange demutualization has, at least in part, fueled a wave of
securities exchange consolidation. 152 On April 4, 2007, the merger between the
New York Stock Exchange and Euronext gave birth to the world's first
transcontinental stock exchange. 153 In the past few years, the push for
consolidation has continued.154 For example, NYSE Euronext and the Deutsche
Brse, which operates the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, have been in merger
discussions as recently as February 1, 2012, when the European Commission
blocked the deal from moving forward based on concerns that the merger would
create a monopoly in derivatives markets. 155 Regardless of the failure of that
merger, national exchanges are slowly fading into the past and being replaced
by transnational entities. 156
150 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The
Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 356 (2006)
(discussing the demutualization of securities exchanges to for-profit entities and the resulting
requirement that these exchanges must "please their shareholders as well as their
customers").
151 See Jenah, supra note 6, at 71 (explaining that demutualization "has... unleashed
pressure from shareholders to increase profits through expansion, investment in new
technology, and cost cutting, forcing these for-profit entities to eschew nationalistic or
protectionist tendencies in the bid for value maximization").
152 See Eric J. Pan, A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 136 (2007) ("Demutualization and increased
competition has led to a wave of consolidation by the European exchanges."); Tafara &
Peterson, supra note 146, at 31 ("Today, mergers and talks of mergers among the world's
stock exchanges make obvious what many finance professionals have long known: capital
markets are global.").
153See generally Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation and Models of
International Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 151 (2007); Sara M.
Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly Transnational Exchange?, 33
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 685 (2008).
154 See Jenah, supra note 6, at 71 (explaining that the current "chess game of proposed
exchange mergers, capital tie-ups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears
witness to the truism that capital markets are global").
155Failed Bid Takes Toll on Exchange, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2012,
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/ 01/business/nyse-euronext-hurt-by-failed-merger-bid.html
(discussing the failed merger between NYSE Euronext and Deutsche Borse because "[t]he
European Commission blocked the deal on Feb. 1, saying the derivatives exchanges would
have given the combined company a monopoly").
156 See supra note 152.
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Remarkably, despite its almost unwavering focus on domestic financial
regulation, 157 the United States has also fueled the globalization of financial
markets by helping to drive financial market participants beyond its borders.
Aggressive regulation, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley, 15 8  and past aggressive
enforcement by financial regulators has caused market participants to look for
opportunities globally. 159 Moreover, the United States' culture of aggressive
litigation, especially by shareholders, has incentivized many to exit from the
United States markets. 160
All of this leads, of course, to the conclusion that financial markets are
global, although they still remain somewhat fragmented as a result of national
and regional regulation. 161 With this dramatic transformation occurring in the
past few decades, fighting domestic and international corruption takes on new
importance in terms of lessening risk to the global financial system.
B. Transnational Corruption in the Global Financial Markets
The presence of corruption within the global financial system should create
universal concern because of how interconnected the world has become, yet the
existence of corruption remains unevenly spread across the globe. In this
section, the levels of corruption throughout the world will be explored.
This exploration of corruption around the world will be unavoidably limited
in two main ways. First, the discussion will be limited to perceptions of
corruption, rather than actual corruption. Actual corruption is extraordinarily
difficult to measure because it can be difficult to detect. Investigations and
prosecutions are not an adequate measure because jurisdictions vary in their
15 7 See generally Eric C. Chaffee, The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act: A Failed Vision for Increasing Consumer Protection and Heightening
Corporate Responsibility in International Financial Transactions, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1431
(2011) (discussing Congress's failure to adequately address the globalization of financial
markets in the myriad of provisions contained within the Dodd-Frank Act).
15 8 See Karmel, supra note 150, at 356-57 (arguing that "the primary reasons why the
NYSE has been losing listings is that foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock
market because of the costs of compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (Sarbanes-Oxley) and because of the U.S. culture of shareholder litigation"
(footnote omitted)). But see Jackson, supra note 3, at 108 ("Although many have pointed to
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as damaging the ability of U.S. exchanges to
compete for foreign cross-listings, there is ample evidence that the erosion of U.S. market
power for foreign listings was already underway well before 2002.").
159 See Jenah, supra note 6, at 71 ("Some claim that the increased regulatory burden in
the United States, combined with mounting concerns over exposure to U.S.-style class
actions and more aggressive enforcement, may be driving companies to raise capital in
foreign markets.").160 Id.
161 See supra notes 142 43 (noting that financial markets are not seamless because most
regulation is still set on the national level).
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anti-corruption regulation and enforcement. 162 Moreover, surveys of regulators
regarding whether they are corrupt are unsurprisingly worthless because few, if
any, regulators would admit that they engage in corrupt activities. Measuring
perceptions of the existence of corruption proves to be the only available
measure. In fact, it may be the best measure because many financial markets,
especially securities markets, are confidence driven, and perception may be
even more important than reality. 163 Second, the discussion of the existence of
corruption in global financial markets will also be limited because the available
current empirical data is somewhat imprecise. Little data is available that
specifically focuses on the existence or the perception of the existence of
transnational corruption. 164 Thus, the discussion in this Article will examine
perceptions of corruption generally because of the lack of data focusing solely
on corruption that transcends national borders.
Transparency International is one of the leading sources for data on
perceptions of corruption throughout the world. The organization is a non-
governmental entity with a mission "to stop corruption and promote
transparency, accountability and integrity at all levels and across all sectors of
society."' 165 Its long-term vision is to create "a world in which government,
politics, business, civil society and the daily lives of people are free of
162 See Wayne Batchis, Reconciling Campaign Finance Reform with the First
Amendment: Looking Both Inside and Outside America's Borders, 25 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
27, 53 (2006) (noting that "approaches to ameliorating political corruption vary significantly
among the countries of the world").
16 3 See Paul D. Cohen, Securities Trading Via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1,
11 (1998) ("Securities markets play a significant role in the economic life of the U.S. and the
world. The growing importance of the securities markets is a direct result of investor
confidence in those markets."); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the
Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 419 (2006) ("If
investors fear being defrauded by issuers, broker dealers, exchanges or other market
intermediaries, or that the investment odds are otherwise rigged, they will no longer invest in
the stock market.").
164 Transparency International does compile the Bribe Payers Index. See 2011 Bribe
Payers Index, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi20l 1/ (last visited July
1, 2012). As Transparency International describes it, "The Bribe Payers Index is a unique
tool capturing the supply side of international bribery, specifically focussing [sic] on bribes
paid by the private sector." 2011 Bribe Payers Index: In Detail, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://bpi.transparency.org/bpi20 1 /in detail/ (last visited July 1, 2012). With that said, this
Index measures only the likelihood of businesses from twenty-eight countries and territories
to pay bribes when doing business. Id Although the Index provides useful information, it
does not focus on the corrupting impact of transnational bribery and it only focuses on
businesses within twenty-eight countries and territories, i.e., the information within the Bribe
Payers Index does not provide a complete or precise picture of the scope and extent of
transnational corruption in global financial markets. See id.
165 Our Organisation: Mission, Vision and Values, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission-vision and values (last
visited July 1, 2012) (providing the mission, vision, and values of Transparency
International).
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corruption."' 166 The organization, which was founded in 1993, describes itself as
"politically non-partisan" and touts its "independence" from outside
influence. 167 It is currently headquartered in Berlin, Germany, and it operates
through more than one hundred national chapters that are located throughout the
world. 16 8 The efforts of these national chapters are coordinated by an
international secretariat in Berlin. 16 9 Transparency International played a role in
the drafting of both the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations
Convention Against Corruption. 1
70
One of the major accomplishments of Transparency International is the
Corruption Perceptions Index (Index). 17 1 The Index is a ranking of countries
based upon perceived levels of public corruption.1 72 It is compiled annually
using various surveys and other assessments as a basis to score and rank
individual nations. 173 it is viewed as one of the best tools for assessing
corruption and is regularly referenced by academics, economists, journalists,
and other individuals in analyzing perceived levels of corruption around the
globe. 174
166 1d.
16 7 Our Organisation: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation (last visited July 1, 2012) (providing a brief overview of
Transparency International and how it functions).
16 8 Our Organisation: Our Chapters, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.
org/whoweare/organisation/our chapters (last visited July 1, 2012) (discussing the role of
the more than one hundred national chapters that are part of Transparency International and
providing a map detailing where those chapters are located).
16 9 Our Organisation: Secretariat, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/
whoweare/organisation/secretariat (last visited July 1, 2012) (describing the secretariat of
Transparency International and the tasks associated with the secretariat's position).
170 Our Organisation: FAQs on Transparency International, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs on transparency international/2/
(last visited July 1,2012) (offering a brief description of Transparency International's role in
drafting the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations Convention Against
Corruption).
171 See Corruption Perceptions Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi (last visited July 1, 2012) (providing a brief
description of the Corruption Perceptions Index and providing links to the current and past
editions of the Index).
1721d.
173 See 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index: In Detail, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi201l in detail/ (last visited July 1, 2012) (offering a
discussion of the Corruption Perceptions Index, including a link to a group of documents
describing the sources and methodology used in compiling the Index).
174See Our Organisation: FAQs on Transparency International, supra note 170
(describing the Corruption Perceptions Index and the parties who regularly reference it).
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
The Corruption Perceptions Index from 2011, the most recent Index
available at the time of the writing of this Article, demonstrates that corruption
poses a threat to the global financial markets. 175 While the United States, most
of Western Europe, Japan, and various other countries are perceived as having
relatively low levels of public corruption, a number of countries that play major
roles in the global financial markets are perceived as having very high levels of
corruption. 176
In compiling the Index, Transparency International scores each country or
territory on a scale from zero to ten in which zero means that the country has a
high level of perceived public corruption and ten means that the country has a
low level of perceived public corruption.1 77 It then ranks each country or
territory in relation to other countries or territories included in the Index. 178 For
example, New Zealand scored a 9.5 in the Index and ranked first by having the
lowest level of perceived public corruption of countries and territories ranked in
the Index; Germany scored an 8.0 and tied for fourteenth; Japan also scored an
8.0 and tied for fourteenth; the United Kingdom scored a 7.8 and ranked
sixteenth; the United States scored a 7.1 and ranked twenty-fourth; and France
scored a 7.0 and ranked twenty-fifth in the Index. 179 These relatively positive
scores and rankings can and should be contrasted with the relatively negative
scores and rankings of many of the countries and territories in Africa, Asia, and
South America. 180 Especially troubling is that many of the countries with the
world's strongest emerging economies have relatively high perceived levels of
public corruption.1 8 1 For example, Brazil scored a 3.8 and ranked seventy-third;
China scored a 3.6 and ranked seventy-fifth; India scored a 3.1 and ranked
ninety-fifth; and Russia scored a 2.4 and ranked one hundred forty-third on the
Index. 18 2 In addition to the Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency
International also compiles a variety of other country-specific information that
tells a similar tale. 183
17 5 See 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index: Results, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi20 I /results/ (last visited July 1, 2012) (providing scores and
rankings of countries throughout the world based on perceived levels of public corruption).
176 Id
1772011 Corruption Perceptions Index: In Detail, supra note 173 (explaining the
scoring and ranking used in the Corruption Perceptions Index).1781Id.
179 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index: Results, supra note 175.
180 See id.
18 1 See id.
1821Id.
183 See Transparency International: Country Profiles, TRANSPARENCY INT'L,
http://www.transparency.org/country (last visited July 1, 2012) (providing information
compiled by Transparency International for purposes of studying and analyzing the
existence of corruption within individual nations); What We Do: National Integrity System
Assessments, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/nis (last visited
July 1, 2012) (discussing the National System Assessments in which Transparency
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Despite the willingness and ability of many countries to fight corruption,
the level of perceived corruption in a number of emerging economies remains a
concern. Because financial markets are global, the susceptibility of these
economies to corruption creates global systemic risk that should be
acknowledged and addressed to help render the global financial markets more
efficient and to prevent future financial crises.
C. The Importance of Transnational Anti-Corruption Regulation in
Preventing or Lessening Future Financial Crises
Although a great deal of progress has been made in regard to the spread of
transnational anti-corruption regulation and in regard to the enforcement of that
regulation, anti-corruption law has largely been ignored as a necessary
component of financial regulatory reform. As a result of the relatively recent
globalization of financial markets, anti-corruption regulation has a new and
increasing importance in reducing systemic risk and in creating a stable global
economic system. A few additional words ought to be offered as to why
transnational anti-corruption regulation is so important in preventing or
lessening future financial crises.
The costs of corruption within financial markets are far-reaching and
expensive. Corrupt public officials can prevent the passage of necessary
financial regulatory reforms and can also prevent the enforcement of laws and
regulations that are currently in existence. In addition, corruption can also
siphon away funds from businesses and prevent or lessen investors' willingness
to invest in companies and partake in other activities that support economic
growth.
Quantitative data on the cost of corruption is difficult to obtain because it is
hard to know how much corruption goes undetected and unprosecuted. The
qualitative data on the impact of corruption is much easier to provide. In
describing the impact of corruption, Transparency International offers the
following description: "Economically, corruption depletes national wealth.
Corrupt politicians invest scarce public resources in projects that will line their
pockets .... Corruption also hinders the development of fair market structures
and distorts competition, which in turn deters investment."1 84 In sum, the
dangers of any kind of corruption, including transnational corruption, are
substantial and can lead to instability in financial markets and potentially dire
results.
International "evaluates key 'pillars' in a country's governance system, both in terms of their
internal corruption risks and their contribution to fighting corruption in society at large").
18 4 See Our Organisation: FAQs on Corruption, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.
transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/faqs on corruption(last visited July 1,2012).
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The globalization of financial markets creates new concerns about
corruption because the increasing interconnectedness of the world means that
financial crises and financial scandals are much more likely to be transnational
and global events, rather than just national occurrences. 185 Corruption within a
single nation could lead to a financial crisis that spills over quickly and easily to
other countries. 186
Even the appearance of corruption can be enough to trigger financial crises
and to create market inefficiencies. For example, as previously discussed,
securities markets are confidence driven, and the perception of corruption may
be even more important than reality. 187 Confidence in the market determines
individuals' willingness to invest and willingness to retain the securities that
they purchase. 188 The stock market crash of 1929 in the United States occurred
in part because of the perception that the state statutes regulating the national
securities markets were inadequate to prevent fraud and corruption within those
markets. 18 9 Ultimately, Congress had to enact a robust and comprehensive
system of securities regulation with the passage of the Securities Act of 1933190
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934191 to restore public confidence and
remove the specter of fraud and corruption. 192
A robust and comprehensive system of transnational anti-corruption law is
required to create stable global financial markets. To lessen or prevent future
financial crises, corruption and the perception of the corruption must be
eliminated to the extent possible, and when acts of transnational corruption do
occur they must be detected and prosecuted as quickly as possible.
185 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (observing that financial scandals and crises
are increasingly international events because of how easily they can spill over from one
country to the next).
186 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
18 7 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
18 8 See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
18 9 See Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section l0(b) and Rule IOb-5: The Continued
Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 843, 851 (2009) (discussing the causes of the stock market crash of 1929 and the
Great Depression).
190 Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-
77aa (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (current version at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 77a 77aa (LexisNexis
2012))).
191 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C.S. §§ 78a- 7 8pp (2 00 6 & Supp. IV 2011) (current version at 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 78a-78pp
(LexisNexis 2012))).
192 See Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief
Under Section l0(b) and Rule lob-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of a Security, 36 SETON
HALL L. REv. 1135, 1138-40 (2006) (discussing the rise of federal securities law in the
United States).
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IV. THE PATH FORWARD
Any activity that helps in the spread and enforcement of meaningful
transnational anti-corruption regulation is a good thing. With that said, the
following actions would be especially helpful in creating a robust and
comprehensive system of transnational anti-corruption law.
First, lawmakers and other regulators in the United States should place a
consistent and constant emphasis on combatting corruption by including active
discussion of it in all financial regulatory efforts. Although a "big" and "bold"
new era of FCPA enforcement has begun, 193 the United States must insure that
this era is not brief and fleeting. The best way to accomplish this is to make sure
that corruption is a constant part of all discussions relating to financial
regulation. Even though the level of perceived financial regulation in the United
States is relatively low, 194 the United States can maintain this reputation by
continuing to focus on preventing transnational corruption and can also
motivate other countries to focus on anti-corruption regulation through its
political rhetoric and actions.
Second, beyond just including combatting corruption in discussions of
financial regulation and enforcement, anti-corruption measures should be
explicitly incorporated into relevant statutes and regulations, whenever possible.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act may have implicitly addressed anti-corruption
issues, 195 the lack of mention of corruption in the voluminous body of the Act is
inexcusable. The drafters of the Act failed to adopt provisions directly
addressing corruption, failed to order any study of corruption as a threat to the
global financial system, and failed to mandate any new or existing financial
regulatory agency to focus its efforts on the prevention of corruption. The
United States was previously able to create a "race to the top" in transnational
financial corruption regulation through its passage of the FCPA, which was the
first statute of its kind. 196 The United States should and must continue to be a
leader in anti-corruption regulation and enforcement as a means of reducing
systemic risk to the global financial markets.
Third, the United States must continue to enforce its domestic and
transnational anti-corruption laws and regulations. Even the most
comprehensive and robust systems of laws and regulations will be ineffective if
they are not enforced. The United States may have entered a "big" and "bold"
era of FCPA enforcement, 197 but no guarantee exists that that era will continue
19 3 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the recent increased emphasis
on FCPA enforcement in the United States).
19 4 See supra note 179 and accompanying text (noting that the United States has a
relatively low perceived level of corruption).
19 5 See Klehm et al., supra note 14, at 936-40 (arguing that certain provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act implicitly help in the fight against corruption).
196 See supra Part II.A (providing an overview of the FCPA and noting that at the time
of its passage it was the first statute of its kind).
197 See Koehler, supra note 17 (discussing the current era of FCPA enforcement).
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indefinitely. The FCPA and other transnational anti-corruption statutes help to
ensure that public officials will engage in regulation and enforcement without
certain types of improper influences. For that to happen, however, the FCPA
and other transnational anti-corruption statutes must also be enforced
themselves.
Fourth, in addition to generally enforcing domestic and transnational anti-
corruption laws and regulation, the United States must continue to support and
provide adequate funding for the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) Foreign Corrupt Practices Unit and the United States
Department of Justice's (DOJ) Criminal Division's Fraud Section. Having
individuals within the government directly tasked with enforcing transnational
anti-corruption law helps to ensure that the new "big" and "bold" era of FCPA
enforcement will continue, rather than a return to a time similar to the initial
decades of the FCPA's existence in which enforcement was a seldom
occurrence. 198 Notably, the creation of the SEC's Foreign Corrupt Practices
Unit in 2010 helps to confirm the existence of a "big" and "bold" era of FCPA,
and if proper governmental support is provided, the Unit will help to guarantee
that the new era will continue. 199
Fifth, the United States must continue to support and provide funding for
the SEC's Office of International Affairs' International Technical Assistance
Program and its efforts to spread transnational anti-corruption regulation
throughout the world. 20 0 The Technical Assistance Program provides training
and support to approximately two thousand regulators in more than one hundred
countries. 20 1 As evidenced by the fact that the FCPA was the first statute of its
kind and that similar statutes have blossomed around the world, 20 2 the United
States traditionally has been very good at exporting its theory of anti-corruption
regulation and enforcement. With the relatively recent adoption of transnational
anti-corruption laws in many countries, however, the United States needs to
continue to be a leader in providing anti-corruption regulation, and it needs to
19 8 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the current increased emphasis
on FCPA enforcement in the United States).
19 9 SEC Enforcement Actions: FCPA Cases, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fcpa/fcpa-cases.shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (discussing
the creation in 2010 of the SEC's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Unit and noting that FCPA
enforcement "continues to be a high priority area for the SEC").
2 0 0 Securities and Exchange Commission's International Technical Assistance Program,
U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia emergtech.
shtml (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) (providing an overview of the SEC's Office of
International Affairs' International Technical Assistance Program).
201 Id. ("Utilizing a faculty of senior SEC and industry officials, and seasoned
practitioners, the technical assistance program provides training to nearly 2000 regulatory
and law enforcement officials from over 100 countries. The program is helping improve
market development and enforcement capacity around the world .... ").
202 See supra Part II.B-D (providing an overview of the international agreements that
are helping to spread transnational anti-corruption laws, which are similar to the FCPA,
around the world).
1316 [Vol. 73:5
2012] THE FCPA AND LESSENING FUTURE FINANCIAL CRISES
continue to provide robust technical assistance regarding anti-corruption
regulation and enforcement. One way of doing that is ensuring that the SEC's
International Technical Assistance Program offers robust assistance to other
nations seeking to improve their anti-corruption regulation and enforcement
efforts.
Sixth, the United States must continue to engage generally in offering
technical assistance to, sharing information with, and providing legal assistance
to national regulators throughout the world. Because transnational corruption is
by definition an international event, international cooperation is imperative for
developing a robust and comprehensive system of transnational anti-corruption
law. The SEC's Office of International Affairs' International Technical
Assistance Program is an important element of international cooperation, but it
is no substitute for a pervasive philosophy throughout the United States
government of international cooperation in the fight against transnational
corruption. In addition, such cooperation is already a requirement of the anti-
corruption conventions to which the United States is a party. 20 3
Seventh, the United States must continue to support the efforts of
international organizations that combat corruption. Most importantly, the
United States must support the OECD's efforts relating to the OECD Anti-
Bribery convention and the United Nations' efforts regarding the United
Nations Convention Against Corruption.
Eighth, the United States should push for additional international
organizations with a financial regulatory focus to undertake work to combat
corruption. For example, the United States should push for the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to increase its efforts to
directly combat and confront corruption because such efforts have been
relatively sparse to date. From modest beginnings, 20 4 IOSCO is currently
composed of regulators from over one hundred jurisdictions who regulate more
than ninety-five percent of the world's securities markets. 20 5 Rather than being
a centralized body for the creation and enforcement of securities law, IOSCO
20 3 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (noting that the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention strengthens international ties for purposes of fighting transnational corruption by
requiring that parties cooperate on matters involving corruption); supra notes 78-83
(discussing the provisions of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption that require
cooperation among parties to the agreement).
2 0 4 See IOSCO Historical Background, OICV-JOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about/
index.cfm?section-background (last visited Sept. 21, 2012) ("[IOSCO] was created in 1983
with the decision to change from an inter-American regional association (created in 1974)
into a global cooperative body. Eleven securities regulatory agencies from North and South
America took this decision in April 1983 at a meeting in Quito, Ecuador.").
205 Id. ("Its membership regulates more than 95% of the world's securities markets and
it is the primary international cooperative forum for securities market regulatory agencies.
IOSCO members are drawn from, and regulate, over 100 jurisdictions and its membership
continues to grow.").
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mainly serves a monitoring and coordinating function, 20 6 and it could be doing
substantially more to coordinate and monitor international anti-corruption
efforts. Because the United States continues to be viewed as a leader in
securities regulation, it could use this influence to help push for IOSCO's
greater involvement in the fight against corruption.
Ninth, the United States obviously cannot create a robust and
comprehensive global system of transnational anti-corruption law alone. Other
nations and international bodies must continue or increase their emphasis on
transnational anti-corruption regulation and enforcement. The OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, the United Nations Convention Against Corruption, and
other international agreements have helped to spread anti-corruption law around
the globe. 20 7 This has led to the passage of transnational anti-corruption
regulation in many nations and harmonization of that regulation among many
countries. Even if that is the case, adoption and enforcement of such regulation
remains incomplete. Efforts must be made to make sure that a robust and
comprehensive system of anti-corruption regulation exists around the world.20 8
206 See About IOSCO, OICV-IOSCO, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Sept. 21,
2012) (offering an overview of IOSCO's central purposes).
20 7 See supra Part II.C-D (discussing the rise of transnational anti-corruption regulation
around the world).
208 Elsewhere, I have argued extensively for the centralization of securities regulation
under an international body. See, e.g., Eric C. Chaffee, Contemplating the Endgame: An
Evolutionary Model for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities
Regulation, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 587 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the
Bottom: An Argument for the Harmonization and Centralization of International Securities
Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of
Securities Regulation: The United States Government's Role in Regulating the Global
Capital Markets, 5 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 187 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of
Opportunity: Reimagining International Securities Regulation in the Shadow of Financial
Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010); Eric C. Chaffee, A Panoramic View of the Financial Crisis
That Began in 2008: The Need for Domestic and International Regulatory Reform, 35 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2009). 1 am comfortable leaving anti-corruption regulation in the hands
of national and regional regulators for two reasons. First, corruption is a difficult crime to
detect, and national and regional regulators are often in the best place to detect transnational
corruption. Second, the current patchwork of transnational anti-corruption regulation is not
developed enough to allow for centralization at this time. Elsewhere, in fact, I have argued
that evolving regulatory regimes should not be subject to international centralization until
they have fully matured. See Eric C. Chaffee & Geoffrey C. Rapp, Regulating Online Peer-
to-Peer Lending in the Aftermath of Dodd-Frank: In Search of an Evolving Regulatory
Regime for an Evolving Industry, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 485, 529 n.247 (2012) (arguing
that peer-to-peer lending should continue to be regulated by national regulators until the
industry and national regulation has fully matured). With that said, international oversight of
all national and regional anti-corruption efforts is a key component to building a robust and
comprehensive system of anti-corruption law.
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V. CONCLUSION
The globalization of financial markets has created new risk, and this Article
details nine courses of action to reduce that risk. With that said, any action that
helps in the spread and enforcement of meaningful transnational anti-corruption
regulation is a good thing. Corrupt public officials threaten the enactment and
enforcement of a regulatory regime that will adequately regulate the global
financial markets. A robust and comprehensive system of transnational anti-
corruption law is required to create stable global financial markets, and in the
absence of such a system, financial crises will occur with greater regularity and
with greater severity.

